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ARTICLES
The Overwhelming Case for
Elimination of the Integration Doctrine
Under the Securities Act of 1933
BY RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
he integration doctrine is one of the most vexing and point-Tless concepts of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933
Act").'
*Alumni Professor of Law, University ofKentucky College of Law. B.A. 1966,
Centre College; J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1972, Harvard
University. The author is indebted to Rodney Chrisman, Jonathan Helton and
David Longenecker for their research assistance.
'Some indication of this, as well as an indication of the significance of the
doctrine to issuers and thus to capital formation generally, is seen in the sheer
numbers of integration no-action requests received by the Securities Exchange
Commission (the "SEC"). Professor Wade reports, for example, that from 1971 to
1979, the SEC received nearly 200 no-action requests on integration. Cheryl L.
Wade, The Integration ofSecurities Offerngs: A Proposed Formula That Fosters
the Policies ofSecurities Regulation, 25 LOY.U. CHI. L.J. 199,220 (1994). Indeed,
the SEC was apparently so overwhelmed by the volume of letters that in 1979 it
announced it would no longer respond to no-action letters respecting integration
matters. CloverFin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13557, at *7 (Apr. 5,
1979) (citing as reasons for discontinuing its prior practice of issuing no-action
letters on integration "the complexity" of the matter and "the possibility that staff
positions may be misconstrued and misapplied"). In 1985, the Commission's
Corporation Finance Division announced it would resume responding to no-action
requests on integration matters. 17 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403 (Mar. 8, 1985)
(stating that the five factors in § 502(a) of Regulation D would be considered in the
letters).
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Under the integration doctrine, a single "offering" or "issue" of
securities cannot be split. Offering, for example, one-half of the shares
under the private placement exemption from registration provided by
section 4(2)2 of the 1933 Act and the other one-half under the intrastate
exemption provided by section 3(a)(l 1).3 The rule similarly prohibits
splitting a single offering or issue between a registration statement and any
exemption from registration. In all events, therefore, the whole of any
discrete offering or issue of securities must be offered and sold under only
one exemption or a registration statement
2 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). That section provides an exemption from regis-
tration for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
3 That section provides an exemption from registration for:
Any security which is apart of an issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security
is a person resident and doing business within or, if a corporation,
incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994).
' For the purposes of this Article, the author generally uses simple and
somewhat sterile examples. While these examples are typical, they are far from
exhaustive. Several additional examples may be helpful in appreciating the
pervasiveness of the integration issues faced by companies engaged in capital
formation.
One of the most difficult integration problems that tis author faced in his
practice days involved the unseasoned and unsophisticated (but otherwise honest
and efficient) entrepreneur who, before seeking legal advice, made an offer of its
securities in a manner that destroyed all available exemptions from registration.
The only way to cure such a problem is to separate the prior illegal offer from the
proposed financing through application of the integration doctrine.
Another example is derived from an actual case arising some years ago when
tax shelter deals were fashionable. Entrepreneurs would form multiple limited
partnerships for the purpose of engaging in certain activities--drilling for oil and
gas, for example. Each of these partnerships would have different properties and
investors but would have the same promoters and be engaged in the same type of
enterprises. The question arose whether the separate offerings by these separate
entities must be integrated. See, e.g., Donohoe v Consol. Operating &Prod. Corp.,
982 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to integrate separate limited partnerships
formed to drill separate oil wells). For a discussion ofthis in the context of multiple
partnership offerings, see ABA Subcomm. on P'ships, Trusts and Unincorporated
Ass'ns,Integration ofPartnershp Offenngs: A Proposal for Identij5ng a Discrete
Offering, 37 BUS. LAW. 1591 (1982) [hereinafter Integration of Partnership
Offerings]. For additional treatment, see ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of See.,
Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41
BUS. LAW. 595, 621-23, 624-31 (1986) [hereinafter TaskForce on Integration].
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Accordingly, if an issuer attempts to bifurcate a single offering into two
separate components and qualify each component under a separate
exemption or, alternatively, under an exemption and a registration
statement, courts or the Commission may conclude that the two putatively
separate offerings in fact amount to a single offering and thus may
"integrate" the two transactions into a single offering. Once this integration
occurs, the breadth of the offering or issue is defined, and all the offers and
sales within tis defined offer or issue must either meet all the requirements
of a single exemption or be made subject to an effective registration
statement.
5
Although the integration doctrine, describedimthese abstract terms, has
a sensible ring to it, commentators over the years have picked at the
doctrine.6 Much of their critical comment has focused on the confusion and
uncertainty in the doctrine's terms7 and the pernicious unpact such
ambiguity has on the capital formation activities of issuers.8
5 In more recent years, the integration doctrine attracted the attention of a
number of scholars. See, e.g., 3 LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1211-28 (3d ed. 1989); Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration ofSecurities
Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV 465 (1979); Lyman Johnson & Steve Patterson, The
Reincarnation ofRule 152: False Hope on the Integration Front, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REV 539 (1989); Daniel I Morrissey, Integration ofSecurities Offenngs-The
ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 26 ARiz. L. REV 41 (1984).
6 For criticism from commentators, see, for example, C. Steven Bradford,
Regulation A and the Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
255, 289 (1994) [heremafter Bradford, Regulation A]. Bradford characterizes
changes to the safe harbor rules of Regulation A as "generally positive and
responsive to criticisms," but laments that "Rule 25 1(c) has failed to reach its
potential." Id. See also Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5 (offering a critical
analysis of Rule 152). Writing in 1986, this author criticized the doctrine as applied
to Regulation D offerings. Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight ofSmallIssuers
(And Others) UnderRegulation D: Those Nagging Problems That Need Attention,
74 KY. L.J. 127, 162-70 (1985-86). In his most recent article, Professor Bradford
mounted a substantial criticism of the integration doctrine, proposing a solution to
the difficulties generated by mtegration through adoption ofa"weighted exemption
system." C. StevenBradfordExpandingtheNon-TransactionalRevolution:A New
Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 473-85
(2000) [hereinafter Bradford, Expanding].
7 Even those who generally support the concept of integration in theory admit
that the doctrine is confusing and inconsistent in application. See, e.g., Wade, supra
note 1, at 208-30.
' For example, Johnson and Patterson provide a description of the "irksome
manner in which the integration doctrine constrains capital financing decisions."
2000-2001]
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On at least two occasions, committees oftheAmencanBarAssociation
(the "ABA") tried their hands at bringing some sense and order to portions
of the integration doctrine.9 The most significant of these ABA initiatives
occurred in the mid-1980s, when a prestigious committee,' ° dnven
primarily by concerns of the practicmg bar over the unmanageable levels
of ambiguity in the doctrine, proposed regulatory amendments to establish
a series of broadly available safe harbors from integration." Interestingly
and tellingly, however, the Chair of the Task Force admitted some years
later that "the hopes of the task force have largely not been realized,.
with the result that integration issues remain a serious problem."' 2
Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5, at 539. The authors appropriately focus on the
special problems of start-up businesses. Id. at 540.
Interestingly, one author seems prepared to argue that ambiguity in the
integration doctrine actually contributes to capital formation, albeit the type of
capital formation she dislikes. Professor Wade states: "The ability of issuers to
manipulate the factors of the SEC's current integration formula allows them to
avoid the application of the integration doctrine and thereby successfully evade the
Act's registration requirements." Wade, supra note 1, at 240.
9 Integration ofPartnership Offerings, supra note 4 (discussing and suggesting
proposals respecting the application of the integration doctrine to successive
offerings by affiliated partnerships). This article and its proposals drew sharp
criticism from Dean Morrissey. Morrissey, supra note 5, at 76 (characterizing the
proposal as "an elegant attemptto circumvent the registrationprocess by artificially
expanding its carefully restricted exemptions'). The second ABA paper was Task
Force on Integration, supra note 4 (dealing more broadly with the integration
doctrine and making recommendations of broad application respecting the
doctrine).
'0 For a list of the members on the Task Force, see Dan L. Goldwasser,
Comments to ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. ofSec., Integration ofSecurities Offerings:
Report of the Task Force on Integration, in 1 SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW" GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
SEcuRrrIms 230 n.* (1991).
" The Task Force divided its safe harbor suggestions into six categones: "issuer
distinctions, temporal separations, differences in securities offered, purpose
differences, policy considerations, and domestic and foreign offering distinctions."
Task Force on Integration, supra note 4, at 624. For a discussion of these
proposals, see id. at 624-41. For areproduction of the specific regulatory proposals,
see id. at 642-43.
2Goldwasser, supra note 10, at 230-3 1.
The report of the Task Force reflects the extreme theoretical difficulties
encountered when one attempts to lend clarity and consistency to the integration
doctrine. The problem, from the author's perspective, is that the doctrine itself is
[VOL. 89
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Even the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is the doctrine's
principal architect, appears to recognize that the integration doctrine has its
problems. As a result, the Commission has developed certain discrete,
regulatory safe harbors from integration" and recently has been especially
generous in its rules protecting issuers, at least m limited situations, from
the permciousness of the doctrine.' 4
Scholars and the Commission, however, misperceive the true
nature of the integration problem, and, as a result, their prescriptions
are overly modest. The fundamental problem with integration
is not its terms; rather, the problem lies m the essential vacuousness
of the doctrine itself. At its core, the doctrine makes no sense.
Indeed, the doctrine is so utterly unsupported by any valid policy"5 that
fundamentally nonsensical. Drafting rules without a principled theoretical footing
is, of course, a problematic exercise. Thus, one can sympathtze with the Task
Force's frustration as it attempted to establish order in such a context.
In fact, the approach of the Task Force, m light of such circumstances, makes
some sense. The Task Force opted to propose a series of safe harbor provisions
designed to clarify, simplify, and reduce the application of the doctrine. Seesupra
note 11. The permciousness of a nonsensical doctrine is ameliorated if the rules
respecting its application are simple and clear. At least clarification and
simplification reduce the transaction costs in those deals in which the doctrine is
implicated, since, for example, the legal costs in determining the application of the
doctrine are reduced by the enhanced clarity of the rule. Similarly, to the extent the
scope of integration is reduced by such safe harbors, the perniciousness of the
doctrine is once again mitigated.
'3Fora list of the Commission's integration safe harbor rules, see infra note 77
"'See, e.g., Rule 251(c) of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (2000). The
Rule was amended in 1992 in connection with the Commission's small business
initiatives. Securities Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 72,439
(July 30, 1992). The new Rule mmunized the impact of integration on Regulation
A offerings. For an outstanding discussion of this provision, see Bradford,
Regulation A, supra note 6.
Unfortunately, the Commission's effort to eliminate uncertainty m the
application of the integration doctrine has been unsuccessful in most instances. See
discussion infra accompanying notes 56-65.
Other commentators, however, are able to find purpose and sound policy at
the core of the integration doctrine. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 1, at 209 (stating
that the doctrine was designed "to prevent issuers from circumventing the Act's
registration requirements"), and id. at 240 (concluding that without the doctrine,
issuers may "successfully evade the Act's registration requirements"); Johnson &
Patterson, supra note 5, at 542-43 (remarking that "the doctrine of integration still
is needed"), and id. at 543 (finding "all-important... policy underpinnings" for the
2000-2001]
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one can only marvel that it has existed essentially unchallenged since
1933.16
The thesis of this Article is that the Commission should entirely
eliminate the integration doctrine from the 1933 Act. The doctrine is
expensive for society 7 and furthers no valid policy of the 1933 Act. More
integration doctrine); Morrissey, supra note 5, at 76-77 (characterizing the
integration doctrine as a way to prevent issuers from "artificially expanding
carefully restricted exemptions" and opining further that "[i]f a combination of
offerings would place the total issuance outside the well considered exemptions to
registration, an SEC filing is in order"); TaskForce on Integration, supra note 4,
at 641 (stating that "[tihe integration doctrine was born out of the necessity to
protect the registration process from circumvention").
t6 As indicated above, commentators have occasionally argued for a limited
elimination of the integration doctrine. For example, Professor Deaktor, writing in
1979, expressed a preference for the SEC to "exercise its rulemaking authority to
eliminate the applicability of integration to all offerings made pursuant to a
transactional exemption other than section 3(a)(9)." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 550.
Professor Deaktor apparently would condition this limited elimination of
integration on the Commission's enactment of a series of new rules pursuant to the
transactional exemptions "which will contain every precaution necessary to protect
investors who are offered or purchase securities in the offerings made pursuant to
these rules." Id. at 544.
" The integration doctrine increases the costs of capital formation in various
ways, some of which are apparent and some of which are not. Obvious costs are
encountered, for example, when the integration doctrine necessitates the
registration of an offering when a valid exemption from registration otherwise
would be available. At least one author, however, may even dispute the
significance of this cost. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 77 (stating that
"registration is not a serious impediment to capital formation"). Dean
Morrissey, however, may be in a minority in his view on this issue. See, e.g., 1
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6, at
49 (2d ed. 1990) (estimating that in 1990 the costs of a public offering, including
underwriting fees, may have been "more than several hundred thousand dollars");
Carl W Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences,
27 VILL. L. REV 1, 31 (1981) (estimating in 1981 that costs for an initial public
offering, not including underwriting fees, ran $175,000 to $350,000).
A less obvious economic cost of the integration doctrine, however, is the
economic costs of the risk it generates. To use a simple example, an issuer may
propose to sell a block of securities under a section 4(2) exemption today and
another block under the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption four months from now. The
lawyer may tell the issuer "It is more likely than not that the two offerings will not
be integrated, but there is a 20% chance, nonetheless, of integration. If integration
occurs, your liability will be approximately $1 million." This risk is a cost to the
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specifically, the doctrine does not promote investor protection but does
retard capital formation, an outcome that is contrary to the presently
articulated purposes of the 1933 Act.'
Part II of this Article traces the history of the adoption of the mtegra-
tion doctrine both by the Commission and the courts, demonstrating the
less than compelling case for the original adoption of the rule.19 Part Il
then outlines the shape of the rule today, in an attempt to demonstrate its
uncertainty, complexity, and lack of connection to any valid prnciple.20 In
Part IV, the Article proposes the author's sinple prescription for the
problems of integration, and that prescription is the complete elimination
of the doctrine.2'
II. A HISTORY OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE
A. The Orginal 1933 Act
As originally signed into law, the 1933 Act contained no clear
statement of an integration doctnne.? Thus, while at various points in the
original 1933 Act one finds words that can be interpreted as relevant to the
matter of integration, the statutory language is inconclusive. Indeed, to the
extent the original language is suggestive of integration, it actually
indicates different integration regimes for different types of offerings.?
At least four of the major exemptions from registration in the original
version ofthe 1933 Act contained language that can be considered relevant
to the matter of integration, and no language from any of the four sections
issuer. It is not unlike the risk that a building will burn, a risk that certainly
amounts to an economic cost, since most owners are willing to pay insurance
premiums to eliminate the risk.
'8 See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
2o See infra notes 48-95 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
' Although, not surprisingly, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") has
been amended on numerous occasions since it was originally enacted, the structure
of the original 1933 Act and, indeed, even its content, are fundamentally similar to
today's version. Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, with 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994). For a discussion of the four major exemptions in the
original 1933 Act, see tnfra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. For a hlstory of
the enactment of the 1933 Act, see 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 168-223.
1 A valid policy reason supporting multiple integration schemes is difficult to
imagine. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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is consistent with the language from any other section. Consider first the
original private placement exemption, which was found m section 4(1) of
the original version of the 1933 Act and stated that "[t]he provisions of
section 5 shall not apply to [t]ransactions by an issuer not with or
through an underwriter and not involving any public offering."24 On its
face, this exemption arguably excludes any application of an integration
concept. If a "transaction" meets the requirements of the exemption, prior
or subsequent additional transactions appear, under the terms ofthe statute,
to be irrelevant.
Next, consider the exemption provided by the first clause of the
original section 4(3), which was essentially the same exemption for single
company reorganizations provided by today's section 3(a)(9). 5 The
original section 4(3) stated that "[t]he provisions of section 5 shall not
apply to [t]he issuance of a security of a person exchanged by it with
its existing security holders exclusively."2 6 Once again, an integration
concept does not appear on the face of this exemption. Instead, the
language seems to exempt from registration the issuance of any security
that is sold in exchange for an outstanding security, without regard to
whether the issuer, for example, may recently have sold securities under
another exemption. Nothing m the language of the section suggests that
such prior sales would ever exclude the availability of the exemption,
unless one is able to bend the word "exclusively" into some indication of
an integration concept, and that appears to be something of an interpreta-
tive stretch.
2 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994)). The modem private placement exemption is found m
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act and now exempts from registration "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
I Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(3), 48 Stat. .74, 77, with 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994).
2 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(3).
2"Notwithstanding the author's view about the clear language ofthe exemption,
the Commission later took the position that the word "exclusively" required the
application of the integration concept. Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 1939
WL 1053 (Aug. 8, 1939). See also 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1232.
These distinguished authors disagree with the author regarding the proper
interpretation of the statute, and give the Commission's interpretation mild
approval by characterizing the Commission's interpretation as one "which seems
as logical as any." Id. Professor Loss and Dean Seligman characterize the
Commission's interpretation of the word "exclusively" as doing "double duty." Id.
In fact, the word does triple duty: It means that shareholders making the exchange
[VOL. 89
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The third significant original exemption was section 3(b), which
authorized the appropriate administrative agency to enact additional
exemptions, if such regulatory exemptions were consistent with the "public
interest" and "investor protection." Exemptive regulations under section
3(b) were subject to the following limitation, however: "no issue of
securities shall be exempted [if] the aggregate amount at which such
issue is offered to the public exceeds $100,000."g28 This language seems
significantly more suggestive of an integration doctrine than does the
language of the two exemptions discussed above, since, at least arguably,
the perimeter of the section 3(b) "issue" must be established in order to
calculate whether the amount limitation has been exceeded.
Finally, consider the original intrastate exemption, which at the time
of the adoption of the 1933 Act was m section 5(c) and provided that the
registration obligation "shall not apply to the sale of any security where the
issue of which it is a part is sold only" pursuant to the terms of the
intrastate exemption.2 9 This language may seem even more indicative of
cannot throw in any additional contribution, that the sale of any security to a non-
shareholder is not eligible for the exemption, and that the common law integration
doctrine is applied to the exemption.
For an outstanding discussion of section 3(a)(9), see I. William Hicks,
Recapitalizations Under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act of 1933, 61 VA. L.
REV 1057 (1975).
1 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994)). The original section 3(b) provided:
The Commission may add any class of securities to the securities
exempted , if it finds that the enforcement of this title with respect to
such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection
of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under
this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered
to the public exceeds $100,000.
Id. at 76-77
29 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(c), 48 Stat. 74,77-78. Section 5(c) of the
original 1933 Act was effective from May 27, 1933 to July 1, 1934. Securities Act
of 1933, § 5(c), repealed by Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 204,48
Stat. 905, 906. Section 202 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 substituted the
modem section 3(a)(1 1) for the repealed section 5(c). Securities Act of 1933, ch.
404, see. 202(c), § 3(a)(11), 48 Stat. 905, 906 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
77(c)(a)(11) (1994)). The revised intrastate exemption contained only minor
changes from the original version, except as concerns the jurisdictional basis for
the exemption. See In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 158
(1935).
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integration than the language in the original section 3(b). Arguably, the
language of this original intrastate exemption suggests that valid sales
under the exemption would be lost if subsequent sales, which were part of
the same issue, were sold under another exemption or a registration
statement.30
One must, however, be careful not to overstate the validity of any of
the foregoing interpretations.3 Indeed, while this discussion suggests that
30 Even this original intrastate exemption, however, is amenable to other
interpretations that would avoid the problems of integration. For example, a court
could define "the issue of which [the intrastate sale] is a part" to include only offers
and sales that meet the requirements of the intrastate exemption. To illustrate this
interpretation, assume that on January 1 an issuer offered and sold 100 shares of
stock pursuant to the private placement exemption, on January 5 offered and sold
100 shares of stock pursuant to the intrastate exemption, and, finally, on January
10, offered and sold 100 shares illegally. Under the interpretation proffered here,
the criteria for including the January 1 and January 10 offerings in the January 5
"issue" would not include, for example, whether the January 1 and January 10
offerings were made virtually contemporaneous with and involved the same class
of securities as the January 5 offering. Rather, the criteria for including the January
1 and January 10 offerings as a part of the "issue" of January 5 would require
assessing whether the January 1 and January 10 offerings were made to persons
residing m the same state as that in which the issuer was incorporated and doing
business.
By defining "issue" in such a way, the court could avoid the permcious effect
of permitting offers and sales taking place around the intrastate offering from
eliminating the availability of the exemption when the policy bases for its
application are otherwise legitimate. Notice thatunderthis interpretationpurchasers
of securities in the January I offering and the January 5 offering would not have
a cause of action, while those purchasing in the illegal January 10 offering would
have a cause of action. This is the sensible and correct outcome. This interpretation
would also bring the interpretation of the integration matter with respect to the
intrastate exemption into line with the plain meaning of the private placement
exemptiQn, which has no hint of any integration concept. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
Another, less perncious interpretation of the integration matter in the intrastate
exemption is offered later in this Article. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
3 While the point of this section is to recount the birth of the integration
doctrine, it is also relevant to consider the modem language respecting integration
and the question whether the post-1933 amendments have altered the obligation to
read an integration concept into the 1933 Act.
The original private placement exemption provided an exemption for
"transactions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter and not involving any
public offering." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current
[VOL. 89
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the language of the particular exemptions provides essentially no support
for integration in the case ofthe ongmal private placement exemption, only
a small amount of support for integration in the case of the original single
company recapitalization exemption, but more support for integration in
the cases of the section 3(b) exemption and the old intrastate exemptions,
m fact, none of these conclusions is founded on anything approaching clear
language.
32
The other interesting and somewhat confounding observation to be
made here is the fact that those original exemptions contain such different
language respecting a possible integration concept. The problem, of course,
is that a valid policy reason supporting multiple integration schemes is
difficult to imaglne. Thus, one is hard pressed to articulate, for example, a
plausible basis for different rules defining the scope of an "issue" or an
"offering" made under the intrastate exemption, on the one hand, and one
made under the private placement exemption, on the other.
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994)). Today's private placement language is
identical, except that the requirement that the transaction not be "with or through
an underwriter" has been eliminated. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This change appears
irrelevant to the matter of integration.
The original exemption for single company reorganizations and today's
exemption contain only minor differences, and those changes concern only the
prohibition against paying for solicitation services in connection with an exchange.
Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(3), 48 Stat. 74, 77, with 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(9) (1994). These changes do not deal with integration.
The original section 3(b) exemption is substantially unchanged in the modem
version of the 1933 Act; the only difference is that the amount limitation has been
raised from $100,000 to $5,000,000. Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §
3(b), 48 Stat 74,76-77, with 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
As originally adopted, the intrastate exemption excluded from the registration
obligation "any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to" local
residents. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(c), 48 Stat. 74, 77-78 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1) (1994)). Today's intrastate exemption excludes from
registration "[a]ny security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to" local
residents. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1 1). Tis change appears to be immaterial as concerns
integration.
32 See, e.g., discussion supra note 30. Johnson and Patterson, in their thoughtful
work on Rule 152, state that the integration doctrine is "not expressly a part of
federal securities statutes." Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5, at 542. Instead, they
describe integration as "a doctrinal construct born of regulatory necessity." Id.
Unlike the author, however, these authors find several "all important policy
underpinnings of the integration doctrine" and argue that the doctrine "still is
needed." Id. at 543.
2000-20011
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Perhaps one can argue that Congress had more faith in one or the other
of those exemptions, and thus, through varying the terms of the integration
concept, determined to expand the scope of the doctrine for sound
exemptions while contracting it for those less sound. Such an indirect way
of limiting exemptions, however, makes little sense. If, for example,
Congress were afraid that offerings under the intrastate exemption would
simply get too big to justify an exemption, it could have imposed an upper
limit on the exemption, perhaps $1,000,000. To argue that Congress
somehow purposefully chose to deal with such a matter by imposing
differing integration concepts on the various exemptions seems far-
fetched.33
B. The "Creation" of the Doctrine
Over time, the task of interpreting the provisions of the 1933 Act fell
to administrative agencies and to courts. Not surprisingly, it was an
administrative agency, specifically the Federal Trade Commission (the
"FTC"), that first constructed and promulgated the integration concept,
and, significantly, tlns occurred within the first year of the effectiveness of
the 1933 Act.
35
As luck would have it, the first administrative opinion on the matter of
integration involved an interpretation of the original intrastate exemption,36
33 On the other hand, a more plausible explanation for the "differing" approach-
es to integration m the four original exemptions may be that no one ever envisaged
an integration doctrine at all or certainly ever imagined it would take on such a life
as it presently enjoys. For tlus author, therefore, the apparently differing treatments
of integration m the original 1933 Act actually weaken any argument that
integration is required by the language of the 1933 Act.
' Initially, the 1933 Act assigned primary administrative responsibility for the
1933 Act to the Federal Trade Commission. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(5),
48 Stat. 74, 75 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(5) (1994)); Securities Act of
1933, ch. 38, § 19, 48 Stat. 74, 85-86 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1994));
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 20, 48 Stat. 74, 86 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 21, 48 Stat. 74,
86 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1994)).
31 See nfra note 36 and accompanying discussion.
36 Securities Act Release No. 33-97, 1933 WL 2080 (Dec. 28, 1933). Appar-
ently in the months following the adoption of the 1933 Act, the Federal Trade
Commission (the "FTC"), wluch was initially assigned admimstrative responsibility
over the 1933 Act, began to respond in letters to mqumes aboutthe new 1933 Act.
In 1933, therefore, the FTC issued the foregoing Release, which consisted of
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which, as described above, contained some of the most compelling
language supporting an integration concept. Also, as luckwouldhave it, the
facts involved m that first opinion appear about as strong as one can
imagine for the application of an integration concept. Since this opinion is
the genesis of the integration doctrine, it merits discussion.
Shortly after the 1933 Act was passed, a company apparently filed a
registration statement for an offering of securities to be sold to the public
m various states. The question posed by the issuer was whether during the
waiting period it could begin to sell these securities under an intrastate
exemption and then after the effective date of the registration statement
complete the offering across state lines pursuant to the registration
statement.
37
These facts, therefore, were particularly compelling for the adminmistra-
tive adoption of an integration concept. The "issue" of securities clearly
had been defined by the registration statement filed by the company, which
proposed to register for sale a defined number of shares of the company's
stock. The issuer, by its own admission, proposed to sell a portion of those
particular securities pursuant to the intrastate exemption andthento sell the
balance of the securities pursuant to a registration statement3
Considering these unusually strong facts, the agency's lack of
experience, and the relatively compelling integration language of the
original intrastate exemption, the FTC's adoption of an integration concept
m its opinion is perhaps not surprising.3 9 Unfortunately, it was a wrong
decision and one that since 1933 has generated confusion and inappropriate
outcomes. To make matters even more unfortunate, the decision was one
that was not required by the words of the Act.4
excerpts from a number of these letters, including one letter dealing with
integration. Id. at *1.
37 Id. at *5.
38 Id.
39 Id.
0 An administrative opinion by the SEC two years later provides support for
interpreting the language of the intrastate exemption as intended to deal with
resales, a vertical matter, mstead of integration, a horizontal matter.
In In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935), the issuer, a
New York Corporation, attempted to utilize the intrastate exemption by selling
bonds to fourNew York banking houses. The bankmg houses, however, resold the
bonds to non-New York residents. The Commission relied on the language in
section 3(a)(11), which limited the availability of the exemption to a "security
which is a part of an issue sold only to persons resident withm a single State," and
found that tns language prohibited quick resales of such securities to persons who
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Nonetheless, five years later, after the SEC had taken over for the FTC
as the regulatory agency with primary responsibility for the administration
of the 1933 Act,41 the SEC with seeming facility promulgated its famous
In re Unity Gold Corp. opinon in which it reaffirmed the FTC's integration
doctrine, applied it to an offering under section 3(b), and commenced an
articulation of the criteria it proposed to use to determine whether
putatively separate offerings would be integrated. Integration atthatpoint
resided outside the state of New York. Id. at 161-62. In broad terms, the
Commission found that to be "an issue sold only to persons resident within" New
York, all shares of the offering had to come to rest in the hands of New Yorkers.
The FTC could have taken the same position m its Release and further concluded
that the language of the intrastate exemption was intended only to limit resales.
Interestingly, the ln reBrooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp. opinion is sometimes
cited-mistakenly, m the author's view-as an integration case. See Morrissey,
supra note 5, at 55 n.133 (stating that it was "the SEC's first application of the
integration doctrine to intrastate offerings").
In a release promulgated in 1937, two years after its opinion in In re Brooklyn
Manhattan Transit Corp., the Commission once again interpreted the same
language in section 3(a)(1 1) (language predicating the availability of the exemption
on the fact that the securities are "part of an issue sold only to persons resident
within" a particular state) as limiting interstate resales until the shares had "reached
the hands of [local] purchasers buying for investment and not with aview to further
distribution or for purposes of resale," or, as the Commission said elsewhere, until
the shares "actually come to rest in the hands of resident investors." Securities Act
Release No. 33-1459, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2260, at 2261-62 (May 29,
1937).
41 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 201, 48 Stat. 881, 908-09.
421 In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938). In March of 1937, Unity Gold
sold 75,000 shares of its stock to Mr. Cronan under section 3(b) and the
Commission's regulations that formed the predecessor to the modem Regulation
A. When, in May of 1937, Unity Gold filed a registration statement for
approximately 600,000 additional shares of its stock, the question arose as to
whether that subsequent registered offering would be integrated back into the prior
sales under section 3(b), thereby destroying the section 3(b) exemption due to the
failure to abide by the $100,000 amount limitation of that section. Id. at 624-25.
The Commission easily found that the section 3(b) offering was part of the
same issue as the registered offering and thus integrated the two, which destroyed
the availability of the section 3(b) portion of the offering. The Commission
concluded that the determination whether the two components should be
considered a "single 'issue"' depended upon "vanous factors concerning the
methods of sale and distribution employed to effect the offerings." The following
were cited by the Commission as factors indicating the appropriateness of
integration: "securities of the same class, offered on the same general terms to the
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became firmly established as a Commission doctrine, and the Commission
has never wavered in its position that integration is an integral part of the
1933 Act 3
Interestingly, courts did not get involved m any significant integration
matters until nearly 1960," and even then their contribution to the
development ofthe doctrine was snplyto accept the doctrine as developed
previously by the Commission 5 Thus, while these early judicial decisions
on integration reflect the inherent difficulty that unspecialized tribunals of
general junsdiction have in dealing with matters as techmcal and complex
as integration,46 courts without hesitation accepted the integration doctrine
public m an uninterrupted program of distribution," and a "single, integrated plan
for the distribution." The Commission cited "material differences in the use of the
proceeds, [and] m the manner and terms of [the] distribution" as factors weighing
against integration. Id. at 625.
41 The SEC has, however, developed different criteria for integration, depending
on the particular exemption or registration involved. See infra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text. Also, the Commission has ameliorated the impact of the
doctrine in certain limited cases. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
"For a discussion of the early integration cases, see infra note 45.
45 For example, m SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp. ("Hillsborough I"), 173 F
Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960), which the author
considers the second-ever integration court case, the court relied on Securities Act
Release No. 33-1459, 1937 WL 1425 (May 29, 1937), in dealing with what the
court deemed an integration issue. A court in the next series of significant
integration cases then relied on Hillsborough I as a basis for its integration
decision. SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F Supp. 830,
871 (S.D. Cal.), modified, aft'd, and remanded, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
Professor Loss and Dean Seligman observe that "the Commission's standard
[for common law integration] in recent years has often been followed by courts."
3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1213. Professor Deaktor, however, seems to
disagree, stating that "a relatively large proportion of the integration cases make no
mention of the work of the SEC in the area, nor of cases or authorities which have
drawn on that work." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 509.
"For example, the court's treatment of the integration issue in Shaw v. United
States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942), is essentially unintelligible. The cases
following Shaw, while broadly intelligible, are nonetheless confusing and based on
uncertain prnciples and fail to articulate with clarity the criteria of integration.
Thus, in Hillsborough I, 173 F Supp. at 86, the second reported case dealing
with integration, the court held that Hillsborough could not rely on the intrastate
exemption because of recent interstate sales of its securities. Virtually the only
explanation offered for integration in this case was a statement of the court
indicating that it would integrate "'all the shares of common character originally
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essentially as it had been developed by the Commission and continue to
apply the doctrine today 
47
though successively issued by the corporation.' "Id. at 88 (quoting Shaw, 131 F.2d
at 478, 480). Obviously, such a statement is overbroad and essentially useless as
a single criterion for integration.
The third reported integration case once again involved Hillsborough. SEC v.
Hillsborough Inv Corp. ("Hillsborough I"), 176 F. Supp. 789 (D.N.H. 1959),
affd, 276 F.2d 665 (lst Cir. 1960). Shortly after the injunction was entered against
Hillsborough in Hillsborough I, Hillsborough offered New Hampshire residents
holding the previously issued shares the opportunity to exchange their shares for
new shares that had somewhat different contractual terms. Hillsborough planned
to sell additional, similar shares to other New Hampshire residents for cash,
claiming that the entire new offering (i.e., both the part sold in the exchange and
the part sold for cash) was exempt from registration under the intrastate exemption.
Id. at 790.
Apparently based on its determination that the new securities "differ from the
old securities [that were sold illegally] only in a small degree," the court
determined that the sale of the new securities under such a condition would be in
violation of the 1933 Act. Id. While the outcome seems based on the notion that the
old offering must be integrated with the new offering, the analysis is far from crisp
and relies more on generalized notions of bad faith. In short, the opinion provides
no meaningful analysis of the application of the integration doctrine or the criteria
used to determine that the two offerings should be combined.
The fourth of the earliest integration cases is Los Angeles Trust Deed &
MortgageExch., 186 F Supp. at 830; here, too, the analysis of the court is less than
precise. That case involved the application of the integration concept to offerings
purportedly made under the intrastate exemption. The court apparently integrated
the offerings because "[t]he terms and conditions under which [the offerings were
made were] identical." Id. at 871.
The purpose of this review is to point out that courts had difficulty in early
integration cases. Such difficulty is understandable, given that the courts were
dealing with complicated and techical matters for the first time.
47 In addition to the cases cited in supra note 46, the next earliest cases (listed
in chronological order) include: Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that
integration did not apply under the factors enumerated in Securities Act Release
No. 33-4552,1962 WL3573 (Nov. 6,1962)); SEC v. Dunfee, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (refusing to integrate
an offering of six percent notes payable in twenty months with an offer of seven
percent notes payable in thirty months); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419
F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F Supp. 609 (D.
Del. 1971) (accepting the definition of integration contained in Securities Act
ReleaseNo. 33-4552,1962 WL3573 (Nov. 6, 1962)); SECv. Continental Tobacco
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C. Observations and Conclusion
The author offers two observations from his examination of the history
of the integration doctrine. The first is that the original statutory language
of the 1933 Act provided a less than compelling mandate for agencies or
courts ever to adopt the integration doctrine in the first place. In some
instances, the wording of the exemptions contained absolutely no language
suggesting an integration doctrine; in other cases, the language was
suggestive of integration but amenable to alternative interpretations. The
second observation is that the entire integration doctrine goes back to an
adminstrative opinion rendered by the FTC only a few months after the
1933 Act was passed. Thus, the doctrine was created approximately
seventy years ago in the middle of the Great Depression by a completely
mexpenenced agency interpreting anew, highlytechmcal statutory regune.
The conclusion of the author, therefore, is that statutory language,
history, and precedent provide no compelling support for the continuation
of the integration doctrine.
III. THE STATE OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE TODAY
Over the years, able commentators have written on the integration
doctrine and its application both broadly and in the context of specific
situations. Professor Deaktor's article, although now over twenty years
old, continues to be the most exhaustive law review article on the doctrine.
Later works by Dean Momssey,49 Professor Johnson and StevePatterson, 50
Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (holding thattwo issues of securities offered
by the defendant were not part of a single plan of financing and therefore should
not be integrated), rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Livens
v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974) (accepting the
definition of integration in Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 1962 WL 3573
(Nov. 6, 1962)) and refusing to integrate six offerings made over an eight month
period because they were not part ofa single plan of financing); Bayoud v. Ballard,
401 F Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Barrettv. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,438 (S.D.N.Y 1976); SEC v.
Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F Supp. 1225,1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (citingHillsborough
I, 173 F Supp. at 86, as support for the integration of two issues of securities that
formed part of a single plan of financing), afid, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977).
Deaktor, supra note 5.
49 Momssey, supra note 5.
50Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5.
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Professor Bradford,"1 and Professor Wade52 all make significant contribu-
tions to the literature on integration, as do, of course, treatises, such as the
definitiveworkbyProfessor Loss and Dean SeligmanP andthe fine treatise
by Professor Hicks.54
The point of this section of the Article, therefore, is not to restate the
work of prior commentators by describing in detail the integration doctrine
and its application to various situations. Instead, the description of the
doctrine offered here is only for the purpose of supporting the author's
critical points by highlighting the doctrine's ambiguity, the absence of any
relationship between the criteria of integration and the purposes ofthe 1933
Act, and, finally, the doctrine's overwhelming andunnecessary complexity.
The discussion of today's integration doctrine can profitably be
bifurcated into the common law rules of integration and the Commission's
discrete safe harbor rules of integration.
A. The Common Law ofIntegration
The common law of integration traces its roots to the early administra-
tive and court decisions described in the immediately preceding section 5
and is applicable to offerings of securities in the absence of any specific
Commission rule dealing with a particular integration matter.
The common law doctrine is best understood as the five factor
integration test that is consistently articulated by the Commission. Thus in
determining, for example, whether securities sold m January ofa particular
year under the intrastate offering will be integrated with securities sold in
April of the same year under the private placement exemption, courts (or
the Commission) will consider whether the two blocks of securities are (i)
"part of a single plan of financing," (ii) "of the same class of securities,"
(iii) offered "at or about the same time," (iv) offered to generate the "same
type of consideration" for the issuer, and (v) offered "for the same general
purpose." In a common law analysis, therefore, the presence of each of
s" Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6.
52 Wade, supra note 1.
5 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1211-28.
547J.WILLiAmIcKs,ExMprEDTRANsACTiONSUNDERHESECURrrIESACT
OF 1933 §§ 1.04[4][b][iii], 2.06[2], 4.03, 7.03[2], 1l.04[2] (2000).
55See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
56 See the discussion in 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1212-13. The
Commission, for example, both m Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 preliminary note
3 (2000), and in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) note (2000), cited these
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the foregoing is a factor that increases the probability that the January and
April blocks of securities would be integrated and thus considered a single
offeringY7
The very nature of these criteria makes them difficult to apply 58 In the
first place, the meaning of the individual factors themselves are generally
ambiguous and confusing. The "single plan of financing" factor, for
example, not only is itself inherently ambiguous59 but also appears to be
similar to the "same general purpose" factor.'
factors as the applicable criteria for integration determinations made outside the
safe harbor provisions of those particular rules.
-7 Professor Deaktor's 1979 article, Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529-38, and
Professor Wade's later 1994 article, Wade, supra note 1, at 211-20, provide
separate, in-depth discussions of each of the five common law factors of
integration. TaskForce on Integration, supra note 4, at 600-23, is also particularly
rich in its research on the five common law factors of integration, although its
discussion is organized around particular exemptions rather than around the factors
themselves.
11 Loss and Seligman state, for example, that tls "multifactor test may firly
be criticized as 'indeterminate."' 3 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1213.
Professor Wade, although clearly supportive of the integration doctrine, concedes
that the doctrine is confusing in its application. Wade, supra note 1, at 211-27
"[T]he SEC's no-action letters and the opinions of courts have provided very little
guidance with respect to the analysis that must be performed under the five factor
test." Id. at 221.
59 Loss and Seligman conclude that the "Comnussion staff's no-action letters
are not entirely consistent' on the definition ofa"single plan of financing." 3 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1214. They state, however, that the term "tends to
refer to factors such as the method of offering the security, the timing of plans for
raising capital, and whether the offerings are financially interdependent." Id.
Professor Wade agrees with Loss and Seligman on the three factors that make up
the "single plan of financing" factor, also finding "confusion from the SEC's
and the courts' failure to define precisely and apply consistently the three suggested
components of the single plan of financing factor." Wade, supra note 1, at 212.
Professor Deaktor states that the staffs definition of this factor "has lacked
consistency "Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529.
60 3 LOSS &SELIGMANsupra note 5, at 1214 ("[T]here tends to be considerable
overlap between instances in which there is a 'single plan of financing' and those
in which there is the 'same general purpose."); Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529 ("In
some inquiries, the single plan of financing factor appears to have been equated
with the purpose of the offerings factor."); Wade, supra note 1, at 213 ("[C]ases
and no-action letters commonly fail to distinguish between the single plan of
financing and the same general purpose factors.").
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The other integration factors are equally uncertain in their meaning.
For example, it is unclear what types of contractual vanances6' are
necessary to establish that two securities are not part of the "same class of
securities."'62 How different do the contractual terms have to be m order to
be separate classes? Are debt and equity always separate classes of
securities? What if the equity is a preferred stock and the debt is a
subordinated debenture that have essentially the same rights, except for the
preference of the debentures over the preferred in bankruptcy 9
Finally, andcertamlywithout attemptingtobe exhaustiveregardingthe
inherent ambiguity in the common law integration factors, consider the "at
or about the same time" factor. Obviously, the time between the sale oftwo
blocks of securities can be one day, one month, one year, etc. How far apart
do the two sales have to be in order to be considered not "at or about the
same time"963 A related uncertainty regarding the "at or about the same
time" factor is the question of whether it is an all-or-nothing matter or,
instead, a factor that counts more (or less) as the two offerings become
closer (or more remote) in time. Under an all or nothing regime, the
existence of the factor might be established by a discrete line (six months,
for example) and all sales within that six month period would be consid-
ered "at or about the same time" and would count the same toward
integration, whether such sales are one day apart or five months and
twenty-nine days apart. Alternatively, the factor could operate without a
discrete line and could vary in its weight, depending on how far apart in
time the two blocks are sold. Under this analysis, offerings one year apart,
for example, may still have a small tendency to support integration, while
6" Interestingly, Professor Deaktor m his discussion of the meaning of separate
classes emphasizes, instead of contractual differences between or among securities,
the identity of the issuer and the identity of the offerees. Deaktor, supra note 5, at
531-32.
62 Wade, supra note 1, at 216-18. "[T]he SEC and courts have failed to
articulate a precise formula to determine whether securities are of the same class."
Id. at 216. Although Loss and Seligman characterize the Commission's approach
to this element as "relatively straightforward," 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5,
at 1218, their subsequent discussion of the element suggests significant uncertainty.
Id. at 1219-21.
63 For example, although Loss and Seligman opine that the six months safe
harbor provision of Rule 147 and Regulation D "suggests that a six-month period
will be necessary to demonstrate that it was not made 'at or about the same
time,"' 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1221, the authors state that a
separation of "six months or more will alone not necessarily lead to
nonintegration." Id. at 1222.
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offerings one day apart may have a much stronger tendency to support
integration.6
4
Beyond the inherent ambiguity m the common law integration factors
themselves, an additional and perhaps even more significant ambiguity is
generated by the uncertainty about the particular mix of factors required for
integration.0 Is one out of five factors sufficient to require integration?
Two out of five? Do some factors count more than others?' What is the
relationslp between strength and number? Does the strength of a factor
6 Professor Deaktor opines that "[p]roximity in time has seldom been
determinative." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534.
65 "Neither the Commission nor the courts have provided express guidance on
how to weigh these factors when analyzing an integration problem." 3 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1222.
One is, of course, reminded of the old Treasury Regulations for determining
whether a business entity other than a trust (called an "association" by the
regulations) was to be taxed as a partnership or a corporation. In order to make this
determination, the regulations set forth four major corporate characteristics that
distinguished a corporation from a partnership. These characteristics were (1)
continuity of life, (2) centralized management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free
transferability ofownerslup interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended
m 1960). An entity exhibiting any three of these corporate characteristics would be
taxed as a corporation, while an entity exhibiting less than that number would be
taxed as a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1960). See
Thomas M. Hayes, Note, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Surrenders: The Check-
the-Box Treasury Regulations and Thei rEffect on Entity Classification, 54 WASH.
&LEEL. REv 1147,1151-1160 (1997), for a discussion of how the old regulations
functioned.
Interestingly, and perhaps instructively for this paper, the Treasury eventually
replacedthe corporate resemblance test with aregune allowing the taxpayer, within
broad rules, to elect whether it will be taxed as a partnership or a corporation.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to-6 (as amended in 1996). See generally Hayes, supra,
at 1160 (describing the function of the new regulations).
" Loss & Seligman suggest that "[a] review of the cases and no-action letters
strongly suggests that the 'single plan of financing' and 'same general purpose'
factors normally are given greater weight than the other factors." 3 LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1222. ProfessorDeaktor opines that "even if [offerings
are] simultaneous [and are thus made 'at or about the same time'], one or more of
the other integration factors often will be viewed as more important." Deaktor,
supra note 5, at 534. See also Wade, supra note 1, at 214 ("Like the single plan of
financing factor, the weight of the same general purpose factor in the integration
analysis is unclear.").
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count more than the number of factors-for example does three strong
factors weigh more heavily than four weak factors?67
The point need not be belabored. Essentially, everyone concedes the
ambiguity in the common law criteria of integration and the difficulty of
applying the criteria. Indeed, this view appears to be held even by
commentators who, unlike this author, are able to find a policy basis for
integration and thus (broadly, at least) support some continued role for the
doctrine.6
An even more troubling aspect of the current common law of integra-
tion is the absence of any connection between the integration criteria and
sound policy. Indeed, the common law criteria of integration actually
encourage conduct on the part of issuers that is socially counterproductive.
This problem is best demonstrated by focusing on the common law
integration factors and the steps an issuer may take under those tests in
order to avoid integration. Assume once again a simple situation in which
an issuer completes an intrastate offering of its common stock in January
and then proposes to offer more securities in April under the private
placement exemption. To avoid integration in such a case, the issuer is
encouragedbythe common law integrationcritenato offer a different class
of securities, perhaps preferred shares, in its subsequent April offering and
to delay the proposed April offering, perhaps for many months. 69
67 At one point in its work the ABA Task Force on Integration lamented:
"[N]owhere is there any indication of how to evaluate these five criteria. In a
number of no-action letters, a single criterion established in the release has taken
precedence over the remaining four." Task Force on Integration, supra note 4, at
623.
61 See, for example, Wade, supra note 1, at 211-20, and the discussion of
Professor Wade's ideas in supra notes 57-60, 62.
69 Another option for the issuer, a response that some commentators find to be
socially advantageous, is for the issuer to register the offering. See supra note 15.
This alternative, however, is problematic, both for its facts and for its policy. First,
if the total offering is small, registration is practically impossible because costs are
prohibitively high. Second, registration of the April tranche following the January
intrastate offering will likely destroy the intrastate exemption for the January
offering, if out-of-state offers are made in April. Registration of the April offering
does not protect the January offering from backwards integration. Finally,
registration is not always an attractive outcome for society. Indeed, Congress has
determined that, based on policy consideration, certain types of offerings and
certain types of offerees and purchasers do not need the special protections of
mandated, scheduled disclosures that accompany registration. See infra text
accompanying notes 99-105.
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One is, of course, at a total loss to find any social benefit in varying the
class of securities or delaying the April offering. Neither of these steps
protects investors nor generates any other perceivable benefit. The January
investors are unaffected by the issuer's alteration of either the contractual
terms of the securities to be offered in April or the timing of the proposed
April offering. Similarly, the subsequent April investors are accorded no
additional protection as a result of such a change.
Importantly, of course, the incentives created by these criteria generate
societal and econonc costs, as the issuer is forced (or is, at least,
encouraged) to change the terms of its optimal investment contract and
postpone its offering. In economic terms, such outcomes raise the issuer's
cost of capital and make the issuer less competitive in the product market.
Stated alternatively, in more human terms, such an outcome is unfair to the
issuer and its constituents, especially in light of the fact that such issuers
are often small entrepreneurs with limited opportunities to acquire capital.
Indeed, in extreme situations these criteria may effectively deny the issuer
access to capital.
In short, issuers, m order to avoid integration under the common law
criteria for integration, are encouraged to act in ways that are actually
socially detrimental. To avoid integration, they are likely to offer invest-
ment contracts that have inefficient financial terms and to market their
securities pursuant to inefficient strategies, and these societal costs are not
counterbalanced by any enhanced investor protection or any other apparent
social benefit.
B. The Commission's Safe Harbor Rules
Over the years, the Commission in a number of instances abandoned
a common law approach to integration matters in favor of a safe, harbor
regime. While the terms of the various safe harbor regimes differ,
compliance with the Commission's criteria for a particular safe harbor
ensures the absence of integration; failure to meet the specific terms of any
particular safe harbor, however, only means that the safe harbor is
unavailable and that integration, therefore, is determined under the
common law rules.
1. Earlier Safe Harbors
Althoughthe Commission's first safe harbor from integration appeared
as early as 1935,70 it was not until the 1970s that the Commission seriously
70 In 1935 the Commission adopted what appears to be the earliest safe harbor
provision, which amounted to an earlier version of today's Rule 152. Securities Act
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pursued integration safe harbors through its adoption of certain regulatory
exemptions from registration. The first of these was incorporated into old
Rule 146,7" which became effective in 1974 and was the predecessor to
today's Rule 506.2 Virtually contemporaneously with its adoption of Rule
146, the Commission also adopted Rule 147,1 which for the first time
established intelligible criteria for compliance with the intrastate exemp-
tion. Rule 147 also contained an integration safe harbor, which was
Release No. 33-305, 1935 WL 2617 (Mar. 2, 1935). This early version of the
modem Rule 152 was subsequently rescinded, readopted, and consolidated.
Securities Act Release No. 33-627, 1936 WL 3434 (Jan. 21, 1936) (adopting the
General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933). The current
version of Rule 152 is codified at 17 CF.R. § 230.152 (2000). For an outstanding
work on Rule 152, see Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5.
71 Rule 146 was initially proposed m November of 1972. Securities Act
Proposed Rule 146, Securities Act Release No. 33-5336, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,108 (Nov. 28, 1972). As finally adopted, the
safe harbor language in Rule 146 stated:
For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to include
offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer
pursuant to the exemptions provided by section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act
or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the Act, that take place
prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six month
period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant
to this rule, Provided, That there are during neither of said six month
periods any offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer
of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold
pursuant to the rule.
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b)(1) (1975) (adopted by Notice of Adoption of Rule 146,
Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 4 S.E.C. Docket 154 (Apr. 27, 1974)).
72 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2000). The safe harbor integration language for
Regulation D differs from the safe harbor language in old Rule 146. Specifically,
Regulation D offerings are protected by safe harbor from:
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start of a
Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after completion
of a Regulation D offering so long as during those six month periods
there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the
same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other
than those offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as
defined in rule 405 under the Act.
Id. § 230.502(a).
73d. § 230.147
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identical tothe integration safe harbor of Rule 146. Although the new safe
harbors m Rule 146 and Rule 147 mitigated, at least to some degree, the
ambiguity ofintegration, the new regulatory integration regumes introduced
by these rules were significantly and needlessly complex and again failed
to connect the criteria for the safe harbor with any legitimate policy 7
The complexity inherent m these early safe harbors and, indeed, m all
of the Commission's integration safe harbors, is due at least in part to the
sheer number of safe harbor regimes and the differences among the vanous
regimes' criteria.76 Presently, for example, the Commission has at least
741 Id. § 230.147(b)(2). The safe harbor language of Rule 147 states:
For purposes of this rule only, an issue shall be deemed not to include
offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer
pursuant to the exemption provided by section 3 or section 4(2) of the Act
or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the Act, that take place
prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six month
period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant
to this rule, Provided, That, there are during either of said six month periods
no offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the
same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to
the rule.
Id.
Thins language is essentially identical to the safe harbor language m old Rule
146. See supra note 71, for the language of the safe harbor provision m Rule 146.
'Even the Commission's more recent attempts to deal with integration through
safe harborprovisions have drawn fire from commentators. For example, Professor
Bradford, writing on the current integration provisions of Regulation A, has
observed:
The changes adopted [to the integration safe harbor rules in Regulation A]
are generally positive and responsive to some of [the] criticisms [from
commentators]. But the SEC's failure to explain or justify provisions like
Rule 25 1(c) produces unnecessary ambiguity and uncertainty. As a result
, Rule 251(c) has failed to reach its potential.
Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 289.
"I Even those regimes that appear to be similar are not. Consider, for example,
the integration regimes mRegulation D, see supra note 72, and Rule 147, see supra
note 74. Under Regulation D, offers and sales outside the six-month window
periods do not destroy the integration safe harbor, so long as during the six-month
window periods the issuer makes no offers or sales of the same class of securities
as are offered in the Regulation D offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Under Rule
147, however, safe harbor from sales outside the six-month window periods
requires not only "clean windows" but also that the sales outside the window
periods be made 'pursuant to the exemptions providedby section 3 or section 4(2)
of the Act orpursuant to a registration statement" Id. § 230.147(b)(2) (emphasis
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seven different integration regimes in its rules.' Accordingly, even
ignoring the difficulty of the interfaces among the safe harbor regimes and
the interfaces between each of those regimes and the common law rules of
integration, one struggles to understand why the Commission would
complicate integration with so many differing sets of integration criteria.
When one begins to apply these safe harbors in instances where two or
more various integration regimes interface with one another, the complexi-
ties of the safe harbor rules increase dramatically Consider the following
example, which is built primarily around the safe harbor of Rule 147 That
particular safe harbor protects a Rule 147 offering from integration with
prior sales, if such prior sales were made more than six-months prior to the
Rule 147 offering, if such sales were made "pursuant to" a section 4(2)
exemption, a section 3 exemption, or a registration statement, and if during
the last six months the issuer has made no offers or sales of a "similar"
added).
' These include: Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2000) (dealing with
integration m certain cases between public and private offerings); Rule 147, Id. §
230.147(b)(2) (1999) (safe harbor from integration in intrastate offerings made
under Rule 147); Regulation D, id. § 230.502(a) (safe harbor for certain small
offerings and private placements made under Regulation D); Rule 701(f), id. §
230.701(0 (safe harbor for certain offerings involving employee compensation
made under Rule 701); Rule 144A, itd. § 230.144A(e) (safe harbor for resales of
restricted securities to certain qualified institution buyers); Regulation A, id. §
230.251(c) (safe harbor for small offerings made pursuant to the requirements of
Regulation A). In the Release adopting Regulation S, the Commission stated:
"[o]ffshore transactions made in compliance with Regulation S will not be
integrated with registered domestic offerings or domestic offerings that satisfy the
requirements for an exemption from registration under the Securities Act, even if
undertaken contemporaneously." Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities ActRelease
No. 33-6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,524, at
80,681 (Apr. 24, 1990).
" Even if the Commission wants different integration standards as a way to
open up or shut down exemptions that it considers more or less desirable, a more
principled and direct path is open to the Commission to reach this objective.
Suppose, for example, the Commission wishes to limit the availability of intrastate
offerings underRule 147 because (forwhateverreason) the Commission concludes
that such offerings are especially ripe for fraud. Rather than making integration
more expansive, which is haphazard in its outcome and essentially unprincipled,
the Commission could impose additional, substantive conditions on the availability
of the exemption-such as limiting the dollar limit of the exemption (e.g., limit
Rule 147 to $1,000,000 per year) or requiring disclosure as a condition for
exemption.
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class of securities like those m the Rule 147 offering. This last criterion is
referred to as a requirement of having "clean windows" or "clean window
periods." 79
In this example, assume that on January 1 Issuer sold a block of its
common stock in reliance on the private placement exemption provided by
the common law of section 4(2), and that on July 1 Issuer sold additional
common shares under a valid registration statement. On August 1, Issuer
proposes a third offering of its common stock, this time as an intrastate
offering under Rule 147 In evaluating the availability of the Rule 147
exemption, Issuer must determine whether either of the prior offerings will
be integrated into its August offering.
Applying the safe harbor criteria from the Rule, one first finds that the
Rule 147 offering in August will not be protected from the July offering,
even though the July offering was registered and thus represents, one
assumes, the ideal way for the distribution to take place. The problem,
obviously, is that the July offering was within six months of the proposed
August offering, and accordingly the Issuer lacks the clean windows that
are required for safe harbor qualification under Rule 147 10
Consider now whether the safe harbor provisions of Rule 147 protect
the proposed August offering from integration with the prior January
offering. Since the section 4(2) offering in January was more than six
months prior to the Rule 147 offering in August, one may preliminarily
think that the safe harbor is available to protect the August offering from
the January offering. The obvious problem, however, is that the safe
harbor, even for sales outside the six month period, requires clean
windows, and the July sale of common stock destroyed the clean windows
for the August sale.8
79 17 C.FR. § 230.147(b)(2). For the text of the integration safe harbor provi-
sion in Rule 147, see supra note 74.81 If, however, the July securities are not of "the same or snilar class" as the
August securities, safe harbor may still be available, since under Rule 147 safe
harbor from the effects of offers and sales outside the six-month window period is
lost if offers or sales within the six-monthwmdow period involve securities "of the
same or similar class as those offered pursuant to" Rule 147 17 C.F.R. §
230.147(b)(2).Forthe language of the safe harborprovision of Rule 147, seesupra
note 74.
81 The contamination of sales during the six-month window penod is eliminated
only if those securities are not "of the same or similar class" as the Rule 147 stock.
17 C.F.R § 230.147(b)(2). The fact that the sales during the window period were
made pursuant to a registration statement, therefore, is irrelevant. For the language
of the safe harbor provision of Rule 147, see supra note 74.
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Even if, however, the Issuer were able to ensure thdt the July sale
involved securities that were not of the "same or similar class" as the
August sale, the safe harbor may not protect the August sale from the
January sale. Assume that m looking at the January offering, Issuer
discovers that an offer was made to an unsophisticated person, thereby
destroying the availability of the section 4(2) exemption for the January
offering.5 Given tins new fact, the safe harbor may not be available to
protect the August Rule 147 offering from the January offering, even
though the window periods are clean and the January offering was more
than six months before the August offering. The possible loss of the safe
harbor rests on the argument that the January offering was not made
"pursuant to" (i.e., in compliance with) the exemption "provided by"
section 4(2), as required by the integration language of Rule 147, wnch
under the Rule is a prerequisite to safe harbor protection. 3
Even if, however, the January offering were at the time entirely in
compliance with the requirements of section 4(2), safe harborprotection for
the August offering still may be uncertain. Now the problem is the notion
of one-way mtegration. 4 Although the safe harbor of Rule 147 is available
to protect the August offering, it does not protect the section 4(2) January
offering. Thus, the question of whether the January offering is contami-
nated by either the registered offering in July or the Rule 147 offering in
August is determined by the common law of integration. The birre
outcome here is that, if under common law integration the July offering or
the August offering is integrated backwards into the January offering, then
the January offering does not meet the requirements of section 4(2). This,
82 Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from registration for
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1994). Broadly, this exemption is predicatedon all offerees andpurchasers having
sufficient sophistication to be able to evaluate the merits and risks of the offering
and having access to the same information that would be contained m a registration
statement See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.21,
at 224-34 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that "[a] literal reading of more recent cases"
leads one to conclude that "[ejach offeree must have access to the types of
information which would be disclosed" m a registration statement, id. at 229
(emphasis added), "offerees must also be sophisticated," id., and "each offeree
must be provided with an opportunity to ask questions of the issuer and verify
information," id. at 231 (emphasis added)).
13 Professor J. William Hicks, certainly one of the leading authorities on Rule
147, reaches a similar conclusion. 7 HICKS, supra note 54, § 4.03[3], at 4-28.
14 A compact and excellent discussion of one-way integration is found in
Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 270-72.
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m turn, may mean that the January offering was not made "pursuant to"
section 4(2), and thus the safe harbor may no longer be available to protect
the August Rule 147 offering from the January offering."5
While instinctively one is skepticalthat such overwhelming complexity
can ever be justified, the problematic nature of these safe harbor rules can
be fully appreciated only when one realizes that, as was the case with the
common law rules of integration, the safe harbor criteria for integration are
unconnected to any sound policy. Thus, the Commission's regulatory
criteria to qualify for a safe harbor from integration again lead issuers to
engage m conduct that is socially counterproductive.
To illustrate this point, consider the steps that the Issuer in the
foregoing example may be encouraged to take in order to garner safe
harbor protection for its proposed August offering in light of potential
contamination by the January offering. Most obviously, the Issuer will
likely take steps to ensure that the August offering has clean windows. This
could be done either by varying the contractual terms between the July
offering and the August offering8 6 or by delaying the August offering for
another five months.8 7
Once again, however, one is unable to find any social benefit for the
requirement that the Issuer take such steps. Neither of these steps protects
the January, July or August investors nor generates any other perceivable
benefit for society. Importantly, such cumbersome steps once again
generate societal and economic costs, as the Issuer is forced to change from
its optimal investment contract or delay its optimal offering date for the
August offering.
Safe harbor criteria, therefore, have done nothing to relieve the
disconnect between the criteria of integration and any valid economic or
85 Professor Hicks opines that such a result would "defeat the whole purpose of
the [safe harbor integration provision of the] Rule." 7 HICKS, supra note 54, §
4.03[3], at 4-27 He characterizes such an outcome as "perverse" and generously
concludes that it is "very unlikely that the SEC would intend such a result." Id.
'6 Under Rule 147, the July offering would not destroy the safe harbor protec-
tion the August offering otherwise enjoys, so long as the July offering does not
involve "offers or sales of securities of the same or similar class as those
[securities] offered or sold" in the August, Rule 147 offering. 17 C.F.R. §
230.147(b)(2) (emphasis added).
7 By delaying the August, Rule 147 offering for an additional five months (a
total of six months from the July offering), the Rule 147 offering would be
protected from the January and the July offering, since those prior offerings would
then be outside the six-month window period and no sales would have occurred
during the window period. 17 C.F.1L § 230.147(b)(2).
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societal policies. Under the safe harbor criteria, issuers are still encouraged
to offer inefficient investment contracts and to market their securities
inefficiently These costs arenot counterbalancedby any enhancedmvestor
protection or any other apparent social benefit.
2. More Recent Safe Harbors
In more recent years, the Commission seems to have made some effort
to simplify and reduce the pernicious effects of its safe harbor regimes.
Thus, for example, the 1992 amendments to Regulation All appear to be an
attempt both to simplify and ameliorate the impact of the integration
doctrine in Regulation A offerings.89 Briefly, a Regulation A offering is
now protected by safe harbor from any prior offering and from certain
prescribed subsequent offerings (including all offerings "made more than
six months after the completion of the Regulation A offering"), and the
safe harbor of Regulation A, when applicable, provides two-way integra-
tion protection (i.e., it protects the Regulation A offering from contamina-
tion by the other offerings and also protects the other offerings from
contamination by the Regulation A offering)f1
Rule 70 1,92 whch essentially provides an exemption from registration
for employee stock purchase plans of non-1934 Act compames, offers an
even more generous safe harbor from integration by providing complete,
two-way protection for and from any Rule 701 offering. 3 In short,
11 Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 7 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 72,439 (July 30, 1992).
'9 Regulation A provides an exemption from registration for offerings of up to
$5,000,000 by non-1934 Act companies. The exemption is predicated upon the
filing of an "offermg statement" with the Commission and providing each investor
with an "offering circular." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2000).
9Id. § 230.251(c)(2)(v).
911d. § 230.25 1(c). Professor Bradford provides an excellent discussion of this
matter. Bradford, RegulationA, supra note 6, at 270-73. Professor Bradford points
out some scholarly disagreement on the notion that the integration protection under
Regulation A is two-way. Id. at 272 n.89 (citing 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 5-12 to 5-14 (2d ed.
2000)).
9 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2000).
9' Once again, Professor Bradford provides an excellent discussion of this
integration provision. Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 270 n.82. Professor
Bradford points out that Professor Hicks has characterized the safe harbor as only
"one directional," but Bradford argues that Hicks is wrong about this. Id. (citing 7A
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integration is not applied to Rule 701 offerings. Accordingly, a Rule 701
offering cannot contaminate any other offering, and the other offering
cannot contaminate the Rule 701 offerng."
These are, of course, encouraging signs, although the Commission is
moving m an extremely slow, uneven, and piecemeal manner and, at least
from the perspective of some commentators, is still leaving substantial
ambiguity and problems untreated.95 Nonetheless, these regulatory
developments reflect, on the part ofthe Commission, some appreciation of
the nonsense of the integration concept and may signal a willingness by the
Commission to engage in a broader reexamination of the concept.
IV INTEGRATION PRESCRIPTION
The prescription offered by this Article for the problems created by the
integration doctrine is simple and direct: the integration doctrine should be
entirely eliminated from the 1933 Act.9
HICKS, supra note 54, § 8.03[3][b], at 8-48 (1993)).
9 The Commission has also taken a special, generous integration approach for
extra-territonal offerings made in compliance with Regulation S. In the Release
adopting that Regulation, the Commission stated: "[o]ffshore transactions made m
compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with registered domestic
offerings or domestic offerings that satisfy the requirements for an exemption from
registration under the Securities Act, even ifundertaken contemporaneously." See
Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 84, 524, at 80,681 (Apr. 24, 1990).
95 Professor Bradford is somewhat critical of the continued ambiguity in the
new Regulation A integration safe harbor, characterizing it at one point as
"expansive yet emgmatic." Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 255.
96 The wholesale elimination of the integration doctrine would not eliminate the
necessity of resolving certain integration-like problems. For example, the
Commission in recent years has always had some type of'regulatory small-offering
exemption from registration enacted under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, and that
exemption has always had some size limitation. Today, that exemption is found m
Rule 504 and is limited to $1,000,000 within any twelve month period. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.504 (2000). In a world without an integration concept, an issuer nght sell
$200,000 in securities on Monday under the exemption provided by section 4(2),
and $200,000 on Tuesday under section 3(a)(11). If the issuer on Wednesday
decides to sell additional securities under Rule 504, a rule would be needed to
determine whether the issuer could then sell securities in the amount of $1,000,000,
$800,000 or $600,000 under the Rule.
Obviously, it would not be difficult to construct a rule dealing with that matter
and to do so without resorting to the integration doctrine.
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While the uncertainty, complexity and misdirected criteria described
m the immediately preceding section are important to the analysis
underlying this recommendation, these problems, standing alone, may be
insufficient to compel a complete elimination of the integration doctrine. 97
Such problems are not, of course, unique to securities laws and, more
importantly, are ones that often can be eliminated or at least amelioratedby
procedural and doctrinal adjustments that are less drastic than the
elimination of an entire doctrine.
In the case of the integration doctrine, however, these less drastic
adjustments are inappropriate prescriptions because the doctrine itself
makes no sense.98 Indeed, the integration doctrine is inconsistent with the
very policies underpinning the 1933 Act itself.
The 1933 Act strikes a balance between investor protection and capital
formation.9 The common sense of tins is overwhelming, of course. The
1933 Act could never have been intended to protect investors to such a
degree that capital formation is precluded. At the same time, investors must
be protected, even if the price of rising capital is increased somewhat.
ThUs balance was in recent years reiterated in the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"). 1O° Specifically,
sectionl06(a) of NSMIA'01 amended section 2 of the 1933 Act to indicate
97 The uncertainty and complexity of the integration doctrine have captured
most consistently the attention of commentators and the bar. An interesting
manifestation of this was the charge to the Task Force on Integration, which-did its
work m the early 1980s. The charge was "to make proposals that would help the
Comnussion and the securities bar to answer questions of integration." TaskForce
on Integration, supra note 4, at 596.
In this writer's view, that was an unfortunate and overly modest charge.
98 In Part III of this Article, the author argued that the criteria for the
application of the integration doctrine are nonsensical. See supra notes 48-95 and
accompanying text Here the author makes a somewhat similar but different
argument, arguing now that the doctrine itself is nonsensical.
99 Wade, supra note 1, at 227 (recognizing, before NSMIA, "the emerging
importance of the Act's policy to assist m capital formation where disclosure
through registration would be unduly burdensome"). An example at the
Commission level of the recognition of the balance can be seen m the way the
Commission developed and ultimately approved Regulation D, with its
increasingly rigorous investor protection as deal size increases. See Campbell,
supra note 6, at 127-31 (outlining the history leading to the adoption ofRegulation
D).
11 National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.
10 Id. § 106(a), 110 Stat. at 3424 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)
(Supp. IV 1998)).
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that the 1933 Act was mtendedboth to provide for"protection of investors"
and to "promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation."
02
These articulated policies, m turn, can be reconciled with a sensible
economic view of the 1933 Act. Under this economic interpretation, the
1933 Act is seen as a legislative scheme requiring mandatory disclosure of
investment information in situations where bargaining between or among
the parties for investment information is inefficient or impossible. This
explains, then, the fundamental rule of section 5 of the 1933 Act, which
mandates disclosure by the issuer to offerees and purchasers in connection
with apublic offering of securities. Bargaining for individually customized
investment information between the issuer, on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, each of the hundreds or thousands of investors in the public
offering, could be considered to be either prohibitively expensive or
literally impossible. As a result, the 1933 Act through section 5 mandates
particularized disclosures that must accompany such public offerings.
Consistent with this analysis, the rule of mandatory disclosure is
relaxed through the exemptions in the 1933 Act in situations where
bargaining for investment information is possible and efficient.103
Accordingly, in the private placement exemption in section 4(2), manda-
tory disclosure is not required, because the investors have "access to
information" and thus are able to "fend for themselves."''1° Similarly, in the
1o Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act now requires the Commission, when engaged
in rulemaking in the public interest, to "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
03 This is somewhat of an overly sunplistic view of the 1933 Act, because m
certain instances the 1933 Act eliminates mandatory disclosure for reasons other
than ease of bargaining for mvestment mformation. For example, in section 3(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994), offerings by banks are exempt from
registration, and one may conclude that this exemption is based, not on the ability
to bargain for investment information, but on the protection of investors by the
regulatory scheme applicable to banks. Another example is section 3(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4), which provides an exemption for securities issued by charitable
organizations and may best be understood as designed to promote charities.
"I These are the broad criteria for the availability of section 4(2) as announced
by the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Punna Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125
(1953). Today, probably the two most mportant requirements for exemption from
registration undersection4(2) are the requirement that the offerees be sophisticated
and the requirement that they have access to the same information that would be
contained in a registration statement. For a good discussion of this, see HAZEN,
supra note 82, § 4.21, at 224-34.
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intrastate exemption in section 3(a)(1 1), Congress apparently concluded
that geographic proximity between the investors and the issuer ensures
efficiency mbargaming for investment information, thereby alleviatingthe
need for mandated disclosure. 05
With these basic ideas in hand, one is able to demonstrate that the
integration doctrine is antithetical to the balances struck within the 1933
Act and thus leads to a mandatory disclosure regime in instances where
Congress mdicatedthat the proper balance between investorprotection and
capital formation called for investors and issuers to bargain for investment
information.
Again, this is best demonstrated by an example. Imagine an intrastate
offering in January under the common law of section 3(a)(11) and a private
placement in April ofthe same year under the common law of section 4(2).
Assuming integration is inapplicable, the January tranche is exempt from
mandated disclosure because, presumably, Congress determined that the
geographic proximity of the parties eliminated any need for mandated
disclosure. All investors in that intrastate block of securities are able to
protect themselves by bargaining for their investment information, and
capital formation is encouraged by eliminating the requirement that the
issuer underwrite the costs of mandatorily providing information that the
investors may not desire. Continuing the assumption that integration is
inapplicable, the April private placement tranche is also exempt from
mandated disclosure, in this instance because Congress determmedthat the
investors' access to information eliminated the need for mandated
'05 Some uncertainty exists regarding the basis for the intrastate exemption in
section 3(a)(1 1). In his early article on Rule 147, Professor Hicks stated:
The following reasons have been offered from time to time in support of the
intrastate exemption: (1) In terms of economic policy, it is useful to allow
securities offeringsby asmallbusinessman to is friends, relatives, business
associates, and others, without federal restrictions; (2) registration for such
small offerings would, as a practical matter, be almost impossible; (3)
investors in local financings are protected by the sanctions of public
opiion; (4) such investors are protected by their proximity to the issuer; (5)
such investors are protected by state regulation; and (6) intrastate offerings
do not present questions of national interest
J. William Hicks, Intrastate Offerngs Under Rule 147,72 MICH.L.REV 463,499
(1974) (footnotes omitted). In its Release adopting Rule 147, the Commission
stated that ifthe conditions of section 3(a)( 11) were met, "[iln theory, the investors
would be protected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state regulation."
Conditions for Intrastate Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release 33-5450, 1
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 2340, at 2611-2 (Jan. 7, 1974).
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disclosure. Once again, all mvestors mthe private placement block are able
to protect themselves by bargaining for investment information, and the
costs of capital formation are reduced by eschewing mandated disclosure.
In this case, therefore, rejecting any application of integration and
thereby preserving each exemption is the sensible outcome, since it
maintains the statutory balance struck between investor protection and
capital formation. The critical point here, of course, is that the existence of
neither tranche compromises the policy bases for the other tranche's
exemption from registration. Thus, the policy bases for not imposing a
regime of mandated disclosure on the January offering is unaffected by the
subsequent April offering. With or without the April offering, the January
investors have the same geographic proxunityto the issuer and accordingly
are able to bargain with equal efficiency for their investment information.
The same holds true for the April investors. With or without the January
offering, the April investors have the same access to information and
sophistication levels that support the private placement exemption
contained m section 4(2). Sales by an issuer, therefore, whether before or
after an exempt offering, are neutral events as concerns the policy bases for
the exemption.
Applying the integration doctrine to this situation, however, reverses
all this and leads to an inappropriate result. Assume, for example, that the
outcome of applying the integration doctrine to our example is to cause the
exemptions from registration to become unavailable, thus forcing the issuer
to register the entire offering.
This result is mconsistent with the 1933 Act and the balance it strikes
between investor protection and capital formation. Congress determined
that the proper balance between investor protection and capital formation
was to be achieved by foregoing registration in instances where either
geographic proximity (the intrastate exemption) or investor sophistication
and access to information (the private placement exemption) made private
bargaining for investment information efficient. By hypothesis, those
conditions exist m our example, and as a result, integration, which forces
this offering into a mandated disclosure regime, essentially and inappropri-
ately reshapes the policies of and balances struck in the 1933 Act.
Some commentators, however, object to the elimination of the
integration doctrine, fearing that such an approach would allow issuers to
evade the strictures of the 1933 Act, specifically the registration require-
ments, by permitting a single public offering to be fragmented under
multiple exemptions-thereby avoiding registration. 1° 6
"o Professor Bradford makes this argument m, its most persuasive form. He
argues that elimination of the Integration doctrine "allows an issuer to avoid
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To demonstrate this concern, consider an extreme example inwiuch an
issuer sells 100 shares of stockunder section 4(2) on January 1, 100 shares
under the intrastate exemption on January 5, 100 shares under section 4(2)
on January 10, and 100 shares under the intrastate exemption on January
15. The issuer may continue this basic pattern, selling at every opportunity
100 shares under the private placement exemption or the intrastate
exemption. Devotees of integration would likely consider this example
strongly demonstrative of the need for the application of the integration
doctrine, arguing as they would that without the doctrine the issuer is able
to make a continual unregistered public offering while evading the
registration obligations of section 5.i07
When examined closely, however, the argument in favor of an
integration doctrine, even in this extreme case, flounders for the very
reasons stated above. Even in this extreme example, each 100 share tranche
is made in a situation in which Congress concluded that free bargaining is
the most efficient way to generate investment information and, accordingly,
that society in such transactions is better offby allowing free bargaining to
determine the scope of disclosure. None of the investors is in any way
harmed by the fact that other securities are sold around the same time as
her or his purchase. The legitimate bases for Congress's willingness to
forego mandated disclosure are similarly uncompromised by the other
offerings.
In short, the integration doctrine makes no sense in any setting. The
availability of an exemption should be entirely independent of the fact
that other offers or sales have (or have not) been made by the issuer. '
Other such sales are irrelevant to the question of whether or not the policy
bases for an exemption exist for a particular sale. Such other offers and
sales are neutral events respecting the question of whether investment
information should be mandated or be the subject of free bargaining
between parties.
registration even where it may be cost effective." Bradford, Expanding, supra note
6, at 472, If, he argues, issuers are able to combine exemptions, the total amount
issuers are able to raise through exempt offerings increases. At some point, he
concludes, the total transaction gets large enough that costs of registration are not
prohibitively large, and, at that point, society benefits from registration.
'
07 See supra note 15.
108 This should not be understood as limiting the Commission's right to enact
regulatory exemptions that contain size limitations, or the right of the Commission
to impose "bad boy" provisions on exemptions (see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §
230.505(b)(2)(iii) (2000)).
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V CONCLUSION
The 1933 Act contains no clear mandate for an integration doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Commission tumbled into the doctrine shortly after the
enactment of the 1933 Act, and thereafter neither the Commission nor the
courts ever bothered to consider whether the doctrine is consistent with the
policies of the 1933 Act.
This exceedingly thin doctrinal history should not be overlooked when
adjustments to or elimination of the integration doctrine are considered.
Thus, the thinness-indeed, the non-existence--of the mandate for the
creation of the integration doctrine should free the Commission and the
courts from the normal restraints of precedent, if they were to choose to
make sense out of this messy situation.
The prescription proposed by this paper is the complete elimination of
the integration doctrine. The doctrine is confusing and complex for issuers
and thus expensive for society. The criteria of integration provide perverse
incentives and thus lead issuers to engage m conduct that is counterproduc-
tive. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the doctrine is antithetical to
the balances struck in the 1933 Act between mandatory disclosure and free
bargaining for investment information, often forcing into a mandatory
disclosure regime offerings in which the policy bases for free bargaining
are intact.
The Commission and its predecessor, the FTC, created this mess. The
Commission, therefore, should through the exercise of its rule-making
power take the lead in eliminating integration. Not only would such
Commission action be consistent with agency accountability, but also the
Commission is best positioned and eqtuppedto effect an efficient remedial
action.
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